War is laced with propaganda. Narratives are ignored and selectively chosen by media on all sides. On this website, we prefer diplomacy over unilateral action, as such actions often create scenarios leading to war. This document shows decisions among Western politicians that do not even attempt to foster peace. Too often does media boil down wars to a simple slogan: for us, against the enemy. Good versus evil. But when it comes to war, it is neither politicians nor media personalities who suffer. It is the common people who fight and risk their lives.
“Of course the people don't want war. Why should some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece? Common people don't want war neither in Russia, nor in England, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along.
Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the peacemakers for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country.” ––Hermann Göring
It works the same in any country. The social mechanism described by Göring can be expanded to the idea behind building a huge military alliance that seeks to confront a non-existent rival—and then creating that rival in the process. Yes, Russia should've accepted that they lost Ukraine as a strategic partner in 2014. The invasion is not justified and probably even works against Russian interests. But the unfortunate reality is that they are willing to wage war over this.
People in Russia have little to no chance to resist the Russian government and media to stop the war from happening. Political leaders in Russia and Donbass radicalized people by claiming Kyiv was a threat to them and their heritage. We can do nothing to change their minds. Therefore it is up to us to stop our leaders and media from engaging with Russia in ways that lead to war.
People in NATO countries do not recognize themselves as a threat because they see their own position as inherently morally superior. As if only their perception of the world grants them the authority to judge. Most people who are engaged with their national interests experience this problem, including in Russia and China, but the West is quite exceptional at this—no doubt with good reason, according to ourselves.
Gaining Perspective
A review from the National Security Archive ▵ shows Soviet leaders being given security assurances against NATO expansion from Baker, Bush, Genscher, Kohl, Gates, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Hurd, Major, and Wörner. The “not one inch eastward” line about NATO expansion to Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of many assurances about Soviet security. Some people argue that, because it wasn't a written agreement it is null and void, but agreements between the Soviet Union and the US had rarely been written down on paper. The German NATO Secretary General spoke extensively about a new security framework. A highlight:
"The primary task of the next decade will be to build a new European security structure, to include the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations. The Soviet Union will have an important role to play in the construction of such a system. If you consider the current predicament of the Soviet Union, which has practically no allies left, then you can understand its justified wish not to be forced out of Europe." ––Manfred Wörner
An American economic advisor in the Kremlin during the fall of the Soviet Union spoke out about how Soviet leadership at the time told him they wished to normalize relations with the West. To be included in the West. He explains this was never pursued by the Americans. Russians across the political spectrum began to feel increasingly frustrated over the years. A 1993 article from the New York Times shows that even during the time of Yeltsin, Russia did not want to see NATO expand. Yet Poland joined in 1999. Yeltsin later said he saw no alternative to co-operating with Clinton ▵.
Like Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Putin wanted to normalize relations with the West when he came to power in 2000. He suggested Russia should join NATO ▵. He spoke about a common European house that included Russia. A few years later he warned about the war in Iraq creating instability and urged for diplomacy. NATO added Romania and the Baltics to in 2004. Then Putin made his 2007 speech in Munich ▵ which reveals the flawed mentality of Western leaders at the time:
“I am convinced that the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as a last resort is the Charter of the United Nations," he said in the tone of a prepared speech, before proceeding in an improvisational tone to address something that happened.
"And in relation to this, either I did not understand what our colleague, the Italian Defence Minister, just said or if what he said was inexact. I understood that he said the use of force can only be legitimate when the decision is taken by NATO, the EU, or the UN. If he really does think so, we have different points of view. I believe that the use of force is only legitimate if through sanctions by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN.” ––President Putin
The Italian defence minster hadn’t considered there was someone present whose country was not included in the EU or NATO. Putin’s critique may seem hypocritical in this day and age, as Russia has unjustly invaded Ukraine, but the invasion came after an extensive decline in diplomacy. The war in Iraq dragged on after Putin’s explicit warnings that the US-led invasion would lead to chaos. In her memoirs, Angela Merkel had this to say about his speech in 2007:
“There were some points that I did not regard as completely absurd. As we know, there was never any evidence of chemical weapons in Iraq. I too had criticised the fact that there had been no progress on updating the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE). [It] should have been adapted after the dissolution of the Warsaw pact, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the accession of eastern European countries to NATO. [...] You could find all of this childish and reprehensible, you could shake your head. But it wouldn’t make Russia disappear from the map.” ––Angela Merkel
An opinion worth considering during the pattern of ignoring Putin for his 20 years in power. There were many off-ramps to steer away from this confrontational attitude. Why expand NATO in the 90s? Why did Bush eliminate the ABM treaty in 2001? Why place missile launchers all across the border starting in 2007? Saying Russia has a Cold War mentality and should stop living in the past is absurd when the other side does exactly the same with its own policies.
Events in Syria…
After Iraq came Libya in 2011, with its leader brutally killed by rebels militarily backed by NATO countries. Next came Syria. In 2012 Finnish ambassador Martti Ahtisaari held talks ▵ with envoys from the UN security council. Russian ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, laid out a plan which included a proposal for Syria’s Assad Al-Bashar to cede power. This was when peace talks started between the regime and the opposition. Ahtisaari, a nobel peace prize winner, believed this to be a serious offer and a path towards resolving the conflict before it expanded. However, the US, Britain and France were convinced the Syrian dictator was about to fall and ignored the proposal. For reference, here is Bill Clinton during an interview with Piers Morgan ▵ in 2013:
Piers Morgan: Did Putin ever renege on a personal agreement he made to you?
Bill Clinton: No, he did not.
Piers Morgan: So behind closed doors, he could be trusted?
Bill Clinton: He kept his word on all the deals we made.
So why did the West refuse? How deep was their involvement with the opposition to Assad? This Wikipedia article about CIA operations in Syria since the coup in 1949 is a good place to start, maybe. How far did propaganda of the West reach, not to mention fake news from their regional allies such as Qatar? Orders to rebel against against Assad also came from Saudi Arabia—who is supplied by the US with billions of dollars in weapons. Leaks revealed that the US cut off the Syria from the internet by accident, leading to more protests and violence as the Syrian government and rebels blamed one another. The US supplied rebels with weapons in operation Timber Sycamore. It was also revealed the US had been planning to exploit discontent since at least 2006:
We believe Bashar’s weaknesses are in how he chooses to react to looming issues, both perceived and real, such as the conflict between economic reform steps (however limited) and entrenched, corrupt forces, the Kurdish question, and the potential threat to the regime from the increasing presence of transiting Islamist extremists. This cable summarizes our assessment of these vulnerabilities and suggests that there may be actions, statements, and signals that the USG can send that will improve the likelihood of such opportunities arising. ––US diplomat William Roebuck
People exaggerate or downplay foreign interference based on which side they support. The same can be said for Russian interference in US elections. Aaron Maté documents this exaggeration well. Despite this, interference did increase tensions between liberals and conservatives. Even if a lot of blame can be put on domestic media running with stories of their own preferences. In Syria's case, it was “liberal establishment” Assad opposed by conservative Muslims and progressives. One reason conservative Sunnis opposed him was because he raised female literacy rates, while the Kurds and other Muslim groups wanted more autonomy.
The brutality of the crackdown meant moderate people fled. Only the fiercest protesters remained, many of them identifying as radical Islamists—the ones the West had been fighting in Afghanistan. In the end, half of Syria was taken over by ISIS, the rest divided between the Kurds, government forces and rebel factions. When Russia intervened, the West accused it of adding fuel to the fire. But that was all the West had been doing up to that point. Only after an explicit refusal to engage in diplomacy did Russia send its troops to Syria. Meanwhile, ISIS was partially formed by transiting extremists due to to US-led occupation and bombing of other regional countries.
Repetition in Ukraine…
This time, it was Ukrainian President Yanukovych who proposed starting three-way talks between Russia, Ukraine, and the EU to resolve the long-standing conflict in policy. He recognized the threat of Russia taking Crimea, as the agreement discussed cooperation on security and foreign policy—which excluded Russian interests. But the EU unilaterally rejected trilateral talks ▵. It was also said that Ukraine could not be in a trade union with Russia under the agreement. A solution for a similar issue would be found a few years later for Northern Ireland after Brexit—which would serve as a sort of intermediate between Ireland (EU) and Great Britain.
President Yanukovych is said to be a traitor and a killer, and maybe so. He was certainly a coward for fleeing his country. But he was also the first Ukrainian president to ask the West for financial aid against Russian aggression—and was stubbornly refused. His election had been considered fair by international observers. He gets accused of being a Russian puppet, but stood against the Kremlin on numerous issues, including preventing unification of Russian and Ukrainian gas companies ▵. If you read the kind of thing he talked about ▵, he seems to present a reasonable path forward—the only path that would have saved his political career and kept Ukraine whole:
“There is no change to our plans. We think (we can sign) once we get down to work and find solutions for economic problems, when we get the opportunity to sign a strategic partnership agreement with Russia and everything else that we need to do, so that normal relations can be established between the European Union, Russia, and Ukraine… this is our responsibility.” ––President Yanukovych
The failure of EU diplomacy to respond appropriately led to the acute removal of the Ukrainian president, with American officials joining in the protests. Like Russian interference in the US election, which occurred in response to this two years later, it is hard to determine the level of impact. There has been up to $150 million invested in Ukrainian media from various western NGOs over the span of eight years. Regardless of media involvement, diplomatic efforts from Victoria Nuland ▵ with Ukrainian opposition groups gave Russia all the motivation it needed. An excerpt from the infamous Nyet means Nyet memo before the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit reads:
"Experts tell us that Russia is worried that the strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO membership, with much of the ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. In that eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to intervene; a decision Russia does not want to have to face." ––Ambassador William J. Burns
Russia kept a military base and port in Crimea since 1772, before the US even existed. Ukraine was integral to Russia’s position on regional security. Imagine if Canada switched sides in the span of a decade because the indigenous population took control of the country and then ousted a president through anti-NATO protests that attended by Russian senators. It would be difficult to believe. The US would intervene in some capacity. This is how Maidan was perceived by Russians, including those native to Donbass and Crimea.
Diplomatic failures created the conditions for Maidan. European leaders refused to discuss a shared regional security and insisted on implementing austerity in Ukraine. Just under half of Ukrainians supported the protests with similar percentages opposing, but the protests were persistent and led to violence—as protests in all countries are eventually confronted by police forces. Even if the European offer had been accepted before Maidan, Donbass would’ve been lost to Russia all the same. Crimea would have still been torn apart from Ukraine.
"Those who make peaceful revolution impossible, make violent revolution inevitable." —John F. Kennedy.
We ignored Ukraine, excluding it and Russia from a conversation about both their security. We refused Ukraine when it asked for its first few billions to deal with the first Russian punitive measures. How much is being sent now that it’s too late? Perhaps with an actual attempt to resolve issues—spoken about for 30 years by one side while ignored by the other—maybe Crimea could’ve been content to join Russia after negotiations. Maybe Donbass and this terrible war would have never happened. Why throw Ukraine under the bus like this?